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Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud:
Fantastic Futures versus Conservative
Histories
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM t
A secret at many leading business schools in the
United States is that there is a certain set of intellectual
tensions between the accounting and finance departments.
The secret should be shared, however, because the
underlying reasons for these tensions may help to explain
the explosion of public company frauds in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. This possibility is important because
policymakers responded to those frauds without awareness
of the tensions. By ignoring how tools developed in the
finance department retard those developed in the account-
ing department, the value of Congress's reforms is
diminished.
Finance theory's rise to intellectual and policy
influence began in the 1970s. It threatened accounting's
relevance. In essence, it denied that accounting forms
matter, holding that markets pierce those forms to deter-
mine value independent of accounting presentation.
Numerous side effects manifest this theory's dominance.
Prominent among them are two practical accounting
developments (a movement toward fair value measures and
discounted cash flow analysis) and two widespread market
practices (pro forma financial reporting and analyst earn-
ings forecasts). These and other side effects reside under
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the broad chapeau of the forward-looking disclosure regime
inaugurated in the 1970s and expanded ever since.
Reforms responding to financial fraud addressed the
two pervasive market practices-targeting symptoms of pro
forma reporting and analyst forecasting-but failed to
address the disease and have, quite possibly, made finan-
cial reporting worse. To correct this oversight, this essay
recommends two steps: (1) the forward-looking disclosure
regime should include delineation of probable variability in
financial data and (2) financial data should be presented in
ranges rather than discrete numerals.
I. TENSIONS
The most powerful theory affecting modern
accounting arose outside the discipline, in the competing
department of finance. Dubbed modern finance theory, its
key concept is the efficient market hypothesis. Under the
efficient market hypothesis, all historical information,
including accounting data, is rapidly impounded into a
company's stock price. Moreover, under this hypothesis, all
publicly-available information is accurately interpreted no
matter how or where it is presented. Therefore, modern
finance theory, which is widely believed,1 implies that any
effort to improve accounting theory or practice is meaning-
less. Finance theory's contribution to accounting is thus its
retardation, for three specific reasons. 2
First, efficiency theory holds that the form of present-
ing accounting information does not matter. If so, there is
no point searching for an optimal form. If identical data can
be placed anywhere in a set of financial statements (the
balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement,
footnotes, or MD&A) and generate the same interpretation
and result on price, promoting accounting quality is
1. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (still the leading statement by
leading corporate law scholars on market efficiency despite many critiques).
2. Cf. Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (1994).
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wasteful. The disincentives to develop superior accounting
are enormous.
3
Second, efficiency theory holds that accounting informa-
tion is instantly useless. Struggles that are central to
accounting, such as allocating economic events to discrete
time periods, become moot. Irrelevant are traditionally
critical-and basic-matters such as rates of depreciation
for long-lived assets and whether to measure inventory
using the first-in-first-out method or the last-in-first-out
method. It even removes questions about whether and how
to account for stock options. Associated costs often are high
and related values fluctuate over multiple periods. 4
Third, efficiency theory holds that market price
responds to cash flow effects of managerial decisions and
policy, not to the effect on reported earnings per share.
Companies should, therefore, never seek to manage
earnings because investors will see through it. If so,
accounting does not have to develop tools to discourage or
detect such massage because it won't happen.5 This implies,
in turn, a relatively modest utility for elaborate systems of
internal control over financial reporting (which are the
heart of reforms adopted in the wake of financial frauds of
the late 1990s and early 2000s).
3. Cf. David Downes & Thomas R. Dyckman, A Critical Look at the Efficient
Market Empirical Research Literature as it Relates to Accounting Information,
48 ACCT. REV. 300 (1973).
4. A leading columnist for the Wall Street Journal argues that it doesn't
matter whether one accounts for stock options or not, for the market will figure
out their significance without regard to accounting.
In the real world, any information, as long as it's deemed relevant, will
be processed into the mill for pricing securities. It doesn't matter
whether the data is computed into the income statement or appears in
a footnote or is shouted up and down Wall Street by a man in a tutu.
Holman W. Jenkins Jr., Much Ado About Stock Options, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3,
2002, at A23. Tell that to Enron shareholders.
5. See George Mundstock, The Trouble with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 813, 819 (2003) ("Under the efficient market analysis, no regulation
of accounting is needed").
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In short, efficiency theory invokes presentiation. 6 To
presentiate is "[t]o make or render present in place or time;
to cause to be perceived or realized as present."7 In
efficiency theory, all numerical history is absorbed into the
current stock price and becomes instantly irrelevant; all
that matters is the future and even this gets "discounted"
into the price. This model of presentiation pretends to make
time disappear. Yet, its enormous power retarded account-
ing as numerical history and reoriented financial reporting
to a forward-looking, less reliable, fraud-tempting emphasis
on prognosis.
Consider two leading examples of finance theory's
force in driving accounting developments: the fair value
movement and cash-flow elevation. Accounting traditionally
measures most assets using historical cost. Recording
assets at historical cost is appealing because cost usually is
observable and thus provides objectivity. It is reliable.
Advocates of more ambitious goals for accounting seek a
fair value approach.8 This fair value movement favors
6. The chief contribution of this concept to legal literature was made in
respect of criticism of the classical theory of contracts which appeared to hold a
conceit that contract formation achieved the reduction of future events to
present control. See generally Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and Presentiation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974). Professor Macneil explained the
concept:
Presentiation is a way of looking at things in which a person perceives
the effect of the future on the present. It is a recognition that the
course of the future is so unalterably bound by present conditions that
the future has been brought effectively into the present so that it may
be dealt with just as if it were in fact the present. Thus, the
presentiation of a transaction involves restricting its expected future
effects to those defined in the present, i.e., at the inception of the
transaction.
Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854,
863 (1978) (footnote omitted).
7. 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1306 (1933).
8. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence
of Fair Value as the Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839
(1996); see also G. A. Swanson, Accountability and the Drift Towards "Fair
Value Measurement", AM. ACCT. ASS'N 2004 MID-ATLANTIC REGION MEETING
PAPER (Apr. 6, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=487043. See generally
USING CASH FLOW INFO. AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS,
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7 (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 2000).
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reporting all assets on the balance sheet at fair value. The
key motivation for fair value accounting is its currency; it is
more relevant.
Accounting struggles with the trade-off between
reliability and relevance. The result is an accounting
system split between these aspirations, usually resolved
under accounting's conservatism principle in favor of
reliability over relevance. The rising influence of finance
caused a shift in accounting to favor relevance over
reliability. True, fair value can be reported using appraisals
or comparable transactions, but the remaining subjective
element puts it in tension with the cardinal accounting
tenet of conservatism.
The fair value movement also has implications for
revenue determinations. Accounting holds that revenues
are not to be recognized until the earnings process generat-
ing them is complete (or substantially complete). An
exception arises for investments in marketable securities,
where gains and losses are recognized according to periodic
changes in related market values of the assets. This so-
called mark-to-market accounting is quintessentially a
quest to bring into accounting a component of the future:
investment values are assumed to reflect the present value
of the related asset's future cash flow.
Enron's pathologically fiendish managers delighted in
the corrosive effects that modern finance theory has on
contemporary accounting. Enron persuaded the SEC to
approve using mark-to-market accounting in most of its
businesses. The company entered into long-term contracts
and used fair value measures to assess contract value.
Enron's managers then recorded those values as revenue
upon contract formation. This practice shredded basic
principles of revenue recognition. It made Enron's income
statement and balance sheet look ridiculous. Enron's
specific escapades reflect widespread cultural obsession
with cash flows, justified, in turn, by systematic diminish-
ment of another long-standing principle of accounting, the
accrual system.
Accounting's traditional accrual system allocates
economic events to discrete fiscal periods based upon a link
to underlying business activity. It contrasts with the cash-
basis of accounting, which records events when cash is
exchanged. The accrual system's key device-the matching
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
principle-pursues this aspiration by insisting that
expenses burden the income statement of the period in
which they contribute to revenue generation (or earlier if
this cannot be determined). The focus is on the income
statement. The accrual system's theoretical basis includes
the stewardship function of accounting information, a
fundamentally historical perspective reflecting how well
managers have operated a business.
Spurred by finance theory in 1987, a separate
statement of cash flows joined the balance sheet and income
statement as an essential component of a set of general
purpose financial statements.9 The accrual system obscures
cash flows, and the cash flow statement makes them
transparent. Financial statement analysts and finance
theorists increasingly focus on cash flows, casting doubt
upon the utility of the accrual basis of accounting and its
focus on the income statement. Consider the following
assertion made by a leading financial economist: cash flow
is a fact, while earnings are an opinion. 10
The cash flow statement's power opens up possibilities
for accounting never plausible with the balance sheet and
income statement alone. Some are desirable, but only when
all three statements are used together. Thus, for example,
the cash flow statement is often superior compared to the
balance sheet for measuring accruals as a way to test for
the presence of earnings management in the income
9. See STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 95, § 27 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1987); see also Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on the True and
Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 893 (2003) (providing historical
perspective).
10. Pablo FernAndez, Cash Flow is a Fact. Net Income is Just an Opinion
(Sept. 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=330540. A famous contempo-
rary debate in accounting theory evaluates whether valuation according to
earnings or cash flows is superior. Compare Stephen H. Penman, On
Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity
Valuation, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 681 (2001) (the case that accounting matters
and that accrual-earnings based valuation models are superior to cash flow
models), with Russell J. Lundholm & Terrence B. O'Keefe, On Comparing
Residual Income and Discounted Cash Flow Models of Equity Valuation: A
Response to Penman 2001, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 693 (2001) (when applied
correctly, valuation models using earnings and cash flow should yield identical
estimates).
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statement.'" Historical cash flows are often better
indicators of future cash flows than are earnings, although
predictions can be improved by using the two together.
On the other hand, a leading use of the cash flow
statement is to help make valuation determinations. 12 In
fact, discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation became, in the
latter half of the twentieth century, the dominant valuation
method, rendering to history's dustbins traditional
valuation methods using assets or earnings. Despite
resistance through the early 1980s,13 DCF is now routinely
used to gauge fair value. Institutions ranging from U.S.
courts to the World Bank endorse DCF valuation
methods.1 4
Two sets of assumptions are necessary to use DCF,
both of which invoke finance rather than accounting
concepts. First, on a cash flow statement amounts are
usually specified-they are accounting facts-but when
analyzing them a wide variety of possibilities appear. They
all start with GAAP earnings but then exclude or include a
host of discretionary items. 15 Resulting expressions (like
EBIT, EBIDTA, and so on) are not accounting concepts. 16
11. See Gopal V. Krishnan & James A. Largay III, The Predictive Ability of
Direct Method Cash Flow Information, 27 J. Bus. FIN. & AcCT. 215 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Zvi BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE (2000); WILLIAM W.
BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2003); RICHARD A.
BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (4th ed.
1991); cf. BRUCE C.N. GREENWALD ET AL., VALUE INVESTING (2001) (the case
against making discounted cash flow analysis the dominant valuation method
in favor of emphasizing asset-based valuation or earnings-based valuation).
13. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (abandoning
previous business valuation framework reliant upon a weighted average of
value estimated using assets, earnings and market price, in favor of framework
permitting all generally recognized valuation methods, the ascendant one of
which was DCF).
14. See M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999);
World Bank, Report to the Development Committee and Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 31 I.L.M. 1379, 1383 (1992).
15. Common short-hands include earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT),
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD), and earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). In each case,
adjustments are made by subtracting from resulting cash-flow figures estimates
of future required reinvestments in the business for capital expenditures.
16. In fact, FASB-ordained GAAP prohibits providing cash flow per share
figures in a set of general purpose financial statements. See STATEMENT OF CASH
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Rather, they are recent inventions of investment bankers
and other financiers. 17 Second, DCF analysis projects cash
flows into the distant future, at least five years, and often
with estimates using growth rates extending into an
infinite horizon period.18 The popularity of DCF thus
underlines a shift in the balance of intellectual power
towards finance and away from accounting.
Despite finance theory's predictions, managers
manipulate accounting forms and markets are fooled, as the
late 1990s dramatically testify.19 Apart from such
experience, a burgeoning theoretical and experimental
literature draws upon behavioral psychology. Behavioral
finance theory undercuts modern finance theory and
explains realities that modern finance theory cannot. 20 A
key concept is frame dependence, which is a bias to
comprehend information differently depending upon how it
is presented. This literature's relation to accounting forms
is clear. It can matter whether and how stock options are
FLOWS, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 95, § 33 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1987).
17. See Erik Lie & Heidi J. Lie, Multiples Used to Estimate Corporate Value,
FIN. ANALYSTS J., March/April 2002, at 44.
18. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE
AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 261-88 (2004) (discussion of valuation techniques,
including DCF).
19. A dramatic large-scale example is the telecommunication industry's
capitalizing of line costs that kept their stock prices high; they plummeted when
it became clear these should have been expensed. See Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It
Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003) (providing a description of the
largest frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s, including those in the
telecommunication industry). Another example is how investors responded to
different accounting for acquisitions under the now-repealed purchase-pooling
distinction. See Patrick E. Hopkins, Richard W. Houston & Michael F. Peters,
Purchase, Pooling and Equity Analysts' Valuation Judgments, 75 ACCT. REV.
257 (2000).
20. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor
Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002) (critique of efficient market
hypothesis using noise theory and prospect theory); Lawrence A. Cunningham,
From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994) [hereinafter
Cunningham, Random Walks] (critique of efficient market hypothesis using
chaos theory and noise theory).
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measured and reported on the income statement, even
though no cash flows exchange hands.21
A difficulty with behavioral challenges to efficiency
theory is their inherent messiness, contrasted with the
elegant beauty of efficient markets. Behavioral theories
explain a wide range of often conflicting biases, whereas
efficiency theory assumes a market behaving as if all actors
were economically rational. Finance personifies the old
economists' joke about looking for one's car keys under a
light in a parking lot because the light is better-despite
losing the keys in some other location. It takes too seriously
Milton Friedman's specification that the test of an economic
theory is not its descriptive accuracy but its predictive
efficacy. 22  Even on these terms, moreover, efficiency
theory's failure to predict-even affirmatively to obscure-
market deception of the late 1990s suggests that it does not
pass Freidman's test.
In fact, however, both efficiency and behavioral
accounts of market behavior may be partially correct,
producing a middle ground. Markets may be substantially
efficient, but prone to periodic bouts of moodiness better
captured by behavioral theories. Such bouts appear to have
characterized the late 1990s and early 2000s and their
21. Numerous other examples appear. Consider America Online's (AOL)
decision whether to capitalize or expense disbursements to build its Internet
subscriber database. AOL capitalized these disbursements and the market price
reflected this decision. And when AOL changed under pressure to expense these
costs, the market price reflected this change. Consider the general practice in
the telecommunication industry of treating capacity swaps as asset and revenue
transactions rather than as liability and expense transactions. See In re America
Online, Inc., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1258, Litigation
No. 16522 (May 15, 2000).
22.
The cardinal rule of economic heforecasting . . . holds that a model's
predictive power is the only relevant test of its validity, not the
assumptions underlying it. See Milton Friedman, The Methodology of
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 23 (1953)
(stating that a "theory cannot be tested by the 'realism' of its
'assumptions"'); see also MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF
ECONOMICS: OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 104 (6th ed. 1985)
(explaining Friedman's thesis to be that the realism of the assumptions
underlying a theory is irrelevant and that models are to be judged by
their predictive power).
Cunningham, Random Walks, supra note 20, at 559 n.60
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associated frauds.23 If so, this experience suggests that
accounting forms matter most when they are least likely to
be obeyed. Accounting's traditional numerical history and
its income statement are thus particularly important
during innovative periods. The late 1990s and early 2000s
were such a period, when market appetites grew for
prognosis using forecasted cash flows.
In this middle ground, reliable accounting is a central
piston in the efficient market engine. Finance and
accounting must be melded into complements, not jealous
opponents. Attention would center on blending income
statements, balance sheets, and cash flow statements,
balancing numerical history with prognosis. Alas, the
symptoms manifest in the late 1990s showing finance
theory's dominance over accounting continues unabated,
despite reforms. This is because reforms addressed only the
symptoms, not the disease.
II. SYMPTOMS
A simple illustration captures the difference between
finance and accounting. If a company sold five widgets last
year, it is clearly a lie for its management to report selling
six. If management says it expects to sell six widgets next
year, it is clearly not a lie to say that they hope to sell
seven. Finance is most interested in expectations-focusing
on six or seven; accounting is most interested in the facts-
that five were sold.
Finance theory thus feeds a common feature of
accounting fraud, which is simply to paint rosy views of the
future. A manager believes that certain targets can be
reached-expecting six and hoping for seven. This belief
supports the view that the future reporting of numerical
history will be superior-better than five. This can create
sufficient managerial optimism to doctor current pictures of
numerical history (call it six this year); the tempted
manager may believe that the rosier future will be capable
of absorbing the difference between actual history and the
imagined future. For example, if the company in fact sells
23. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); see also ANDREI
SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS (2000).
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five this year but seven the year after, management can call
it six apiece. 24
Two salient features of the late 1990s dramatize
indulgence of finance theory over accounting practice. These
were the proliferation of analyst earnings reports specifying
expectations and corporate pro forma figures expressing
hopes. Wall Street analysts are steeped in the finance
school, not the accounting school. Analysts may actually
believe that they, as the market, know better than the
results that appear from applying traditional accounting
principles. While some undoubtedly take accounting
standards seriously and insist on evaluating performance
using accounting information, many-during the late 1990s
at least-pressured managers into making elaborate fore-
casts of future performance. This was delicately called
"guidance" and led analysts to define and disseminate
"expectations." Many of these analysts, moreover, worked
for securities firms whose investment banking department
sought underwriting business from the companies that
analysts followed. The coziness of the relationship magni-
fied the inclination to extract rosy predictions of the future
from the past. For the analyst community, social proof set
in: if everyone believes a forecast, it must be true.
These futuristic orientations pressured management
to recast actual historical experience, to conform to and
facilitate prognostications. The practice of pro forma
financial reporting became widespread in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. This involved presenting financial data in
forms that deliberately varied from GAAP. While managers
defended these forms using various obfuscating arguments,
including that GAAP just didn't work well for their special
business, underlying the practice was an impulse to show
how the future would (hopefully) look. The practice was
obnoxious, omitting items of ordinary expense and making
other GAAP departures to display steadily growing sales,
24. Cf. In re BT Securities Corporation, 58 S.E.C. Docket 1145 (Dec. 22,
1994), reprinted in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE AND
GOVERNANCE 286-93 (2d ed. 1996). In this matter, tape recordings of a
derivatives trader captured him describing how undisclosed losses on a client
account would be made up when the market moved favorably, as follows: "I
mean we told him $8.1 million when the real number was 14. So now if the real
number is 16, we'll tell him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away at
that differential between what it really is and what we're telling him."
MITCHELL, supra, at 280.
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net income, and-most importantly-cash flow. In an era of
market bubbles such as the late 1990s, people wanted to
believe these giddy pictures of the future. Efficiency theory
reinforced the fantasies since participants were able to
conclude that the market must be right-a whole new
economy must have been born.
These symptomatic practices spawned respective
sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 cracking down
on their proliferation. 25 These reforms, however, fail to
rectify underlying demand for prognosis rather than
history. Greater emphasis on the future is most evident in
the longer-term trend begun in the mid-1970s with the
advent of the forward-looking disclosure regime, the disease
that breeds finance's dominance over accounting.
III. DISEASE
Until the late 1970s, the SEC and federal securities
law prohibited disclosure of forward-looking information. 26
In that period, market appetite for forward-looking
information intensified, 27 and participants pressured the
SEC to change its stance. After substantial resistance, the
SEC relented, allowing forward-looking disclosure.
Thereafter, the SEC went further, encouraging, and some-
times requiring, forward-looking information.28 The SEC
25. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 401(b), 501, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7261(b),
78o-6 (Supp. II 2002) (discussing pro forma reporting and securities analysts
respectively); see also SEC Regulation G, 17 C.F.R. pt. 244 (2005)
(implementing limitations on non-GAAP disclosure under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act).
26. See Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance,
Securities Act Release No. 5362, 38 Fed. Reg. 7220 (Feb. 2, 1973); Exchange Act
Release No. 9984, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH )
79,211, at 82,666 (Feb. 2, 1973) ("It has been the Commission's long standing
policy generally not to permit projections to be included in ... reports filed with
the Commission"); Guides for Disclosure of Projections for Future Economic
Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5992, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 81,756, at 81,037 (Nov. 7,1978) (authorizing forward-looking
disclosure).
27. E.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Policy Meaningful?,
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1976, at 32, 35-37.
28. See SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b) (2005) ("The Commission
encourages the use . . . of management's projections of future economic
performance that have a reasonable basis and are presented in an appropriate
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characterizes related disclosure as addressing "trends and
uncertainties" in a business. 29 This opens up accounting's
traditional conservatism towards finance theory's obsession
with estimations and discounting the future.
The movement for forward-looking disclosure
blossomed in the early 1970s, as efficient market theory
ascended. 30 Opponents of forward-looking disclosure made
three key arguments favoring the SEC's traditional stance
prohibiting prognostication. 3 1 First, forward-looking state-
ments are inherently unreliable and misleading per se.32 No
one is clairvoyant; management can be no more clairvoyant
than investors or other users of financial reports. Second,
investors likely would assign undue credence to formal
managerial disclosure of forward-looking information, de-
spite this inherent unreliability. Third, forward-looking
information is more susceptible to managerial manipulation
than hard historical fact. All three objections have proven
valid, underscored by the accounting frauds of the late
1990s and early 2000s.
Supporters of forward-looking disclosure emphasized
that all investment valuation and related decisions are
about the future, a point opponents did not dispute.
Disagreement concerned whether managers or investors are
better positioned to conduct prognostication. While support-
ers did not believe either group was clairvoyant, they
opined that managers were somehow better equipped than
format."); 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (mandating disclosure of "any known
trends or uncertainties that [management] reasonably expects will have a
material favorable or unfavorable impact on . . . revenues or income from
continuing operations").
29. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). See generally Quinton F. Seamons,
Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A Disclosure, 25 SEC. REG. L.J. 239 (1997).
30. See John C. Burton, Elephants, Flexibility and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, Bus. LAW., Mar. 1974, at 151; see also Homer Kripke, The
SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151
(1970).
31. See Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities
Regulations, 16 Bus. LAw. 300, 307 (1961) (despite reality that investment
value is a function of future financial performance, managers are not
clairvoyant and management attempts at forecasting are "almost invariably...
misleading because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority
which in fact does not exist.").
32. See JOEL SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 611
(Northeastern Univ. Press 1995) (1982).
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investors to provide reasonable forecasts. 33  This
represented a subtle shift in roles: traditionally, managers
applied accounting to report results of known events and
transactions and investors applied finance tools to make
related investment decisions.
Devotees of forward-looking disclosure also redefined
the target audience for financial disclosure from the
average ordinary investor to the sophisticated investor; this
move sought to negate the claim that investors would give
undue credence to managerial forecasts. 34 Finally, manipu-
lation risk could be neutralized by imposing on managers
an obligation of good faith when providing forward-looking
disclosure.35
The debate's resolution led to a system requiring more
and more forward-looking disclosure, with SEC releases in
1979, 1982, and 1989 increasing this orientation. 36 Early
proponents disagreed as to whether this regime should be
voluntary or mandatory; the result was initially an
experimental regime based on voluntary disclosure. It
gradually moved to one mandating specific kinds of
forward-looking disclosure. 37
As for whether forward-looking information should be
targeted at the sophisticated investor or all investors, terms
of debate shifted from the 1970s to the 1990s. Early on,
supporters argued that managers should provide forecasts
to sophisticated investors outside formal SEC filings. 38
While this approach dominated for two decades, the SEC
33. See Kripke, supra note 30.
34. See generally Burton, supra note 30.
35. See Kripke, supra note 30, at 1198-99.
36. See SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 611 (SEC's 1982 adoption of Item 303 of
Regulation S-K concerning MD&A and forward-looking information "is the key
part of the evolution of the Commission's approach to accounting from an
emphasis on 'hard fact' to its present emphasis on 'soft' or predictive
information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item.").
37. See id. at 559-61.
38. Compare Kripke, supra note 30 (objecting to extant practice that SEC
position perpetuated of "differential disclosure," meaning professionals
receiving projections in presentations, conference calls and press releases the
public at large did not receive), with Burton, supra note 30 (urging reorientation
of SEC target audience from "the stockholder without clout, if you will" and
''sophisticated investors and professional analysts through whom information
would be filtered down to less sophisticated investors and their brokers").
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reversed course in the late 1990s by adopting Regulation
FD to require that guidance provided to one investor must
be provided simultaneously to the public at large. 39 This
step completed the circle that the forward-looking
disclosure regime inaugurated: (1) managers were redi-
rected from accounting to finance and (2) all investors were
functionally brought inside the enterprise by mandates that
managers supply finance-oriented information.
Regulatory efforts ensuing from the forward-looking
disclosure debate thus resolved numerous contentious
questions. The resulting regime is mostly mandatory; it
requires good faith and reasonable grounds for predictions;
and makes the same predictions available to all investors
whether sophisticated or not. Never resolved in this debate
on the merits, however, is the argument of opponents that
forward-looking information is inherently unreliable. It
remains true, after all, that no one is clairvoyant. The late
1990s and early 2000s also show that even so-called
sophisticated investors are not immune from being fooled
by managerial manipulations.
Accordingly, the SEC's early cautious regulatory
response to market demand for futuristic information
showed prudence. In fact, the reality that forward-looking
information is inherently unreliable manifested immedi-
ately upon implementation of the forward-looking disclo-
sure regime. Managers would forecast various business
developments for market participants eager to clarify their
own cloudy crystal balls. When these judgments turned out
differently, plaintiffs' lawyers sued. This litigation showed
symptoms of the underlying reality that forward-looking
information is inherently unreliable. Rather than ever
confronting this reality squarely, the regulatory regime
focused on these symptoms by designing devices to address
associated litigation abuses. 40
Safe harbor provisions are the leading device to
address litigation abuses associated with forward-looking
39. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective Disclosure and
Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000).
40. See SELIGMAN, supra note 32, at 559-60 (quoting SEC official and leading
securities lawyer of the period, A. A. Sommer, as saying that litigation aspects
were the "biggest headache" associated with the new forward-looking disclosure
regime).
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information. These insulate issuers from liability in private
actions when forward-looking statements are accompanied
by cautionary language underscoring their basic
unreliability. The SEC, Congress, and courts all partici-
pated in developing related doctrines. 41 The judiciary used
the so-called bespeaks caution doctrine. 42 It provided a case-
by-case evaluation of whether forward-looking information
was accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert
a reasonable investor to the information's tentative quality.
The SEC and Congress essentially codified this doctrine.
While some evidence indicates that the forward-
looking disclosure system enhanced overall quality of
information and its interpretation,43  drawbacks have
appeared.44 Managers forecast future earnings and equip
analysts to do so; analysts then widely disseminate
41. See Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. 230.175 (1933); Securities
Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. 240.3b-6 (1934); Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Section 27A of the 1933 Act) and 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 Act) (2000). For a concise summary of
the intricate provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
addressing the relationship between its safe-harbor provisions and the kinds of
forward-looking information that are required, encouraged, and permitted, see
Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Karen Kennard, Greater Expectations: Risk Disclosure
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-An Update, 2 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 331, 335-54 (1996).
42. See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir.
1993); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993); Rubenstein v. Collins, 20
F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir.
1999) (also interpreting Congressional and SEC safe harbor provisions). See
generally Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus.
LAW. 481 (1994).
43. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 6
(9th ed. 2003) (citing Artyom Durnev et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Presentation at the American Law
and Economics Association Annual Meeting (May 12, 2001) (examining impact
of mandatory forward-looking disclosure in MD&A on share prices).
44. See Mark S. Croft, MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure, 45 S.C. L. REV.
477 (1994) (reviewing history of forward-looking disclosure regime and
examining litigation arising under it). For a general assessment and
prescriptions to reform the forward-looking disclosure regime not using safe-
harbors but through formal SEC release articulating its parameters and
furnishing detailed guidance, see Joel Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft
Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995). See also Suzanne J.
Romajas, Note, The Duty to Disclose Forward-Looking Information: A Look at
the Future of MD&A, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S245 (1993) (providing a more
optimistic assessment).
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expectations across the marketplace; this creates pressure
to meet these expectations. (When a company sold five
widgets, it created a historical record; when managers say
they expect to sell six and hope to sell seven, they create
expectations and hopes.) Managers who fail to meet
expectations and hopes are punished severely. This, in turn,
increases pressure to enhance reports of numerical history
to conform to the prognosis previously painted.45 The result
is often escalating accounting pressure to repaint history to
conform to increasingly out-of-reach prognosis.
These effects are not met by regulatory efforts to
police litigation abuse arising from prognostication. More
problematic than second-guessing by litigation is the first-
order stage on which this information is demanded and
supplied. But this problem, likewise, has never been
addressed. Demand for forward-looking information is
demand for what is inherently unreliable. Supplying the
information sets markers that are bound to result in
disappointment. Specifying the targets creates pressure to
meet them, and when fundamental business strategies
cannot do so, accounting massage becomes more tempting.46
In the extreme, finance destroys accounting.
45. In theory, ex ante awareness of future punishment for disappointed
expectations should constrain managerial optimism; in practice, however, this
constraint is weak. See Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall
Street: Putting A Stop to the Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41 (2002).
46. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
Forward-looking disclosure . . . must often be made with less-than-
complete confidence of their accuracy, with the nagging sense that with
more time, doubts about data quality might naturally diminish. From
time to time, senior executives will discover, much too late, that the
truth is indeed quite different from what they have been led to believe.
To be sure, senior executives cannot explicitly acknowledge this. Part
of the essential dramaturgical role of senior managers is to
communicate confidence and control over their environment, and . . .
many management theorists believe that effective corporate disclosure
must reflect a comparable level of confidence in control, if not
performance, by the senior management group. Thus, even putting
aside the possibility that those top managers have their own selfish
reasons to distort, there is a substantial risk of a mismatch between
what they say and what, once a retrospective look at what all those in
the organization actually knew or sensed is undertaken, was "known"
by others in the firm.
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Not only has inadequate attention been paid to this
feature of the contemporary financial reporting environ-
ment, 47 the safe-harbor mechanisms used to address the
identified litigation problem appear equally inadequate to
their task. What is needed is a policy to address both
challenges. This must constrain undue second-guessing
litigation and limit forecasting likely to pressure managers
to report accounting figures in light of those estimates
rather than based on subsequent business reality.
IV. METASTASIZING
Despite limitations of peering into the future using
forward-looking disclosure, reforms push further in that
direction. This shows not only potential misdiagnosis of the
disease and questionable prescription, it manifests the
depth and ubiquity of modern culture's preoccupation with
the future. Two reforms highlight this: movement towards a
continuous disclosure system and development of an early
warning system provided by auditors based on the quality
of an entity's internal control over financial reporting.
The apotheosis of modernity's future obsession in
securities markets and law is the pressure for a continuous
disclosure system. This is a concept designed to require
real-time display of various financial developments. 48 Long
sought by market participants and recently encouraged by
the SEC, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) adds force to this
movement by directing the SEC to adopt rules to hasten the
Id. at 125. Mismatch risk poses two challenges: second-guessing litigation,
which the securities law framework has addressed, and pressure to finesse a
match, to which inadequate attention appears to be paid. See G. Mitu Gulati,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 Nw. L.
REV. 773 (2004) (examining judicial responses to disappointed expectations
arising from prognosis).
47. Debate concerning the merits of a forward-looking disclosure system was
intense in the 1970s, see supra note 46 and accompanying text, but thereafter
cooled and the system's role in the financial frauds of the late 1990s and early
2000s was neglected.
48. See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
Securities Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 747 (1985); Dale Arthur Oseterle, The
Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for Publicly
Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet"?, 20 CARDOZO L REV. 135 (1998); see
also Erick D. Prohs, Note, Periodic Reporting: A Relic of the Past?, 27 J. CORP. L.
481 (2002).
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phenomenon. Under SOX, companies must disclose
publicly, on a "rapid and current basis," all material
changes in their financial condition or operations, including
trends providing qualitative information and graphic
presentations. 49
SOX uses the word "disclose," disguising its more
profound shift in market appetite and regulatory
philosophy-likewise disguising latent dangers. The
innovation of the original federal securities laws was a
move towards disclosure. Mandatory disclosure, Louis
Brandeis famously quipped, is the best disinfectant.50
Current pressures for real-time display go beyond
disclosure. They move towards transparency. Again, this
shift reflects finance-driven pressure towards real-time
accounting, presenting enormous challenges to basic
accounting concepts such as allocation of economic events to
multiple fiscal periods. Accompanying these pressures,
moreover, are appetites for systems and research designed
to provide a continuous auditing function, despite numerous
recognized obstacles to this undertaking. 51
Contemporary calls for heightened transparency
across society often appear as unbounded virtues.5 2 But
49. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(l) (Supp. 112002).
50. See LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS
USE IT 92 (1914) ("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light
the most efficient policeman.").
51. See Vernon J. Richardson & Susan W. Scholz, Corporate Reporting and
the Internet: Vision, Reality, and Intervening Obstacles, 11 PAC. AcCT. REV. (Dec.
1999/Jan. 2000). Numerous conferences on the concept of continuous auditing
have been staged in recent years. See Rutgers Accounting Website,
http://www.accounting.rutgers.edu (last visited Nov. 8, 2005) (listing the
conferences that have been held on continuous auditing and reporting).
52. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate
Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996).
Transparency is an eleventh commandment of American life generally,
not just of financial markets. We insist on open hearings all through
government; we open up to public scrutiny under the Freedom of
Information Act the records that elsewhere would be kept confidential;
we relentlessly pursue the tax returns and business dealings of almost
anyone seeking high public office. We do all this as part of the public's
unquestioned (if sometimes exaggerated) "right to know." It comes as
no surprise that what is so ubiquitous in our society should affect the
financial reporting of the country's major businesses.
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good reasons appear to doubt this proposition. 53 Otto van
Bismarck reportedly cautioned that, "[i]f you like laws and
sausages, you should never watch either one being made."54
The same is true for those who like financial reports.
Consider how managers are to develop this continuous
information- display.
On a daily basis, companies generate internal
financial data, such as sales, accounts receivable balances
and charge-offs, inventory levels and obsolescence. These
financial data reveal trends. These trends can amount, on a
temporary basis, to material changes in financial condition
and operation. Mandatory display of these trends is
functionally equivalent to mandatory transparency of
business operations on a daily basis. It opens for view daily
financial recording, not periodic financial reporting. This
echoes the process associated with the dawn of forward-
looking disclosure era of managers generating finance data
and distributing it to investors.
Besides impairing the efficacy of accounting's fiscal-
period assumption, daily changes are not indicative of
quarterly or annual aggregates. This information is most
useful to managers during an accounting/operating period.
It equips them to make course corrections, taking such
steps as strengthening sales efforts in lagging segments or
improving collection practices when receivable charge-offs
rise in certain customer bases. The information is useful to
redirect trends and to manage the materiality and direction
of financial condition and operation.
Id. at 1342. Professor Lowenstein's comments addressed the traditional
disclosure system, not the kind of transparency digitization injects. Calls for
transparency routinely are heard concerning business, government,
international agencies, military operations, diplomatic corps, academia and
other organization types. See generally SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: CREATING
TRUST AND HOPE IN ORGANISATIONS (Rupesh A. Shah et al. eds., 2003); Cynthia
A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1197 (1999).
53. For a careful assessment of the appeal and limits of transparency, using
the example of corporate voting in the mutual fund industry, see Alan R.
Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOzO L. REV. 1419 (2001-2002).
54. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAw vii (Kermit L. Hall ed.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
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Whether corrections succeed takes more than a few
days of dashboard data to sort out. Premature disclosure of
adverse trends may sustain them, disabling managerial
corrections. If sales are seen flat in one region, customers in
adjacent regions may switch to competitor products; if
receivables collections are seen slowing among some
customers, other customers may join the laggards.
Investors and other corporate constituents are likely better
served by giving management time and leeway to make
improvements, not respond to them on a daily basis. 55
If the new rules under SOX only tinker with manda-
tory continuous display, consider a proposal for pure
transparency made by a senior SEC official. 56 It prescribes
changing the existing financial reporting environment
using two devices: (1) requiring companies to report real-
time bookkeeping information on publicly-accessible
websites (including real-time journal entries, ledger
summaries, monthly aggregations and so on) and (2)
requiring management to respond publicly to questions
concerning this information.
The theory of this substantive transparency (not mere
disclosure) is to equip investors having requisite interest
and resources to perform their own financial statement
audits of companies, or engage their own auditor to do so.
Apart from numerous other practical problems, 57 it is
55. E.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities
Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995) (general analysis concluding with an
example of how disclosure concerning Caterpillar Inc. subsidiary in politically-
unstable Brazil could have exacerbated political risks); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990) (explaining how managerial
withholding of information may benefit investors rather than harm them as
often assumed).
56. See Peter K.M. Chan, Breaking the Market's Dependence on
Independence: An Alternative to the 'Independent' Outside Auditor, 9 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 347 (2004). When Peter Chan's article was published, he was
Associate Regional Director, Enforcement, in the SEC's Midwest Regional
Office. (His views, of course, do not necessarily represent those of the SEC.)
57. As examples: (1) supplied information is raw bookkeeping data and
limited questionnaire access to management; neither investors nor their
auditors have access to a company's system of internal control, audit
committees, walk-through exercises, or other essential resources used in
traditional auditing and (2) the result would require enormous investor
coordination and/or result in numerous separate investor-audits, generating
wasteful duplicative costs.
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doubtful that such deep transparency is in the best
interests of corporations or investors. 58 But the proposal
shows enduring reform-based emphasis on finance
(transparency) not accounting (disclosure).
The second reform highlighting the urge for
transparency concerns auditing. In traditional financial
statement audits, auditors speak as of a moment in time
about financial statements prepared as of a prior date and
for a prior period, providing hard facts. These are
attestations of numerical history. Auditors are financial
archeologists. They provide three paragraphs of standard-
ized text to express unqualified opinions, and offer a few
additional sentences in other situations.
Reforms implemented in mid-2004 vastly expand the
auditor's task, transforming it from financial archeologist of
numerical history into a forecaster of financial reporting.
The reform requires auditors to test and opine upon a
company's internal control over financial reporting. 59
Though based upon a current examination and providing an
opinion about control maintenance during a past accounting
period, it is quintessentially about the future-the auditing
standard describes itself as creating an "early warning
system."60
The key trigger requiring auditor forward-looking
disclosure is the existence of a material weakness in such
control. The concept of material weakness is forward-
looking, defined as risk that material misstatements will
not be detected or prevented in the future. The auditing
58. See Udo C. Braendle & Juergen Noll, A Fig Leaf for the Naked
Corporation? (2004), http:l/papers.ssrn.comlpaper.taf.abstractid=523102 (mak-
ing the specific case against utter transparency in corporate financial report-
ing). See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload
and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003)
(expressing more general reservations); Elizabeth Boros, Corporations Online,
19 COMPANY & SEC. L. 492 (2001) (survey of 100 large Australian companies
documents grounds for skepticism as to using corporate Web sites to deliver
"universal real-time free access to continuous disclosure information"). This
concern is wholly apart from protecting proprietary information that would
necessarily be covered by such a proposal. See Chan, supra note 56, at 391-92.
59. AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED
IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Auditing Standard
No. 2 (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
60. Id. 6.
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standard requires auditors to describe material weaknesses
along with their actual or potential future effects on the
company's financial statements.
The early warning system's likely effectiveness must
be evaluated by comparison to the kindred system of
forward-looking disclosure in place for business substance
since the 1970s. At a minimum, to make this system
meaningful will likely require the same kinds of safe-harbor
concepts developed for the forward-looking disclosure
system.6 1 Even those, of course, produced imperfections in
the relation between forward narrative and eventual
reporting of numerical history. Analogous challenges
appear in this control audit innovation.
Nevertheless, a virtue appears in this otherwise
indulgent futurism. By insisting on auditor assessment of
control, the reform rejects finance theory's implications that
accounting controls are of limited utility. This rejection is a
useful antidote to widespread preoccupation with the future
creating demand for and supply of phony financial
forecasting. On balance, however, the reform amounts to
one step forward and one step backward.
V. CURES
Numerous policies might address the problem of
forward-looking information. This essay identifies two such
policies. One policy is legal: redefining the disclosure
standards applied to managers. The other policy is
business-related: redefining how financial figures are
reported. Both address the inherent unreliability of
forecasts, which the forward-looking disclosure regime
never has.
The first policy cure operates within the existing
forward-looking disclosure regime. Rather than require,
permit, or encourage managers to provide forecasts of
earnings (or other measures), the regime could simply
require managers to disclose material risks of future
61. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing's New Early
Warning System: Control Disclosure, Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1449 (2004).
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adversity.62 The purpose of this regime would be to provide
a basis for investors to gauge the degree to which a
company's numerical history is useful as a guide to
probable future performance. Inherently unreliable
estimates of future performance would not be required,
permitted or encouraged.
The second policy cure prescription operates within an
altered framework for accounting. It takes one lesson from
finance. Accounting should not use a single figure for every
financial statement item (aggregating underlying transac-
tions). In many cases, only estimates are reasonably
possible, even for events and circumstances that have
occurred. The appropriate amount of reserves for doubtful
accounts and the methods for measuring inventory and cost
of inventory sold are not capable of definitive measurement.
Yet accounting has always imposed this result.(Managers
cited this as one reason for using pro forma figures-
although these figures also often pinpointed single figures.)
The solution is straightforward. Accounting figures
should be reported in ranges, not single amounts. Thus,
accounting should abandon the conceit of computing a
single number for earnings and a single number for owners'
equity and instead report a range of reasonable figures for
each. This would more fairly reflect the fundamental
challenges and limits of accounting, a system tied to
numbers and history yet still capable only of providing
ranges with any reliability. After all, when used to
aggregate large numbers of measurements, the reliability of
single discrete measurements degrades. The need for such a
change is increasingly important as contemporary events-
both scandals and reform-increasingly push accounting
towards the future.
CONCLUSION
Finance-and the digitized-information age-demand
from accounting what it cannot reliably deliver. Reforms
62. See Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor
Protection: The SEC and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139,
1154-56 (2003) (prescribing a complete overhaul of MD&A to provide "what
investors really want and need [which] is a warning of material future risks...
[and] discussion of their probability and magnitude from management's
perspective . . ").
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directed at enhancing the orientation toward the future not
only miss the points but exacerbate what they miss.
Feeding the beast of information-hungry finance culture
must be accompanied with training the beast. Mankind has
long dreamt of knowing tomorrow's news today and
contemporary culture whets that appetite because it seems
so much more within reach. In accounting and securities
regulation, however, hunger for tomorrow's news today can
be perilous.63 Finance and accounting must work together
to overcome these tensions-and the limits of each
discipline. Lawyers involved in formulating federal
securities disclosure policy would benefit by reconsideration
of market fascination with the future; this essay scratches
the surface.
63. Cf. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (insider trading
conviction arising from Wall Street Journal columnist privately and criminally
sharing tomorrow's news today).

